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Increasing waves of labour migration from the Southern Indian state of Kerala 
to the Arabian Gulf have led to a series of new developments exemplified by 
rising consumerism, especially among middle class Muslims in the state. An 
interesting result of migration has been not only the adoption of the Arabian 
female black dress, the pardah, but also its enforcement as a uniform and a 
marker of religiosity by Islamic groups. Whereas global forces leading to the 
creation of job opportunities in the Gulf have positively impacted the state of 
Kerala in relation to levels of human development and education, Muslim 
women are witnessing increased social controls. Paradoxes lie in attempts to 
create emancipatory tools out of the confining frameworks of patriarchal 
domination characteristic of much of Keralite society. This paper is based on 
ethnographic material seeking to unravel the different dynamics of agency and 
domination in Northern Kerala. 
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Introduction 
Starting from the late 1970s, South India, and 
especially Kerala, witnessed intensive labor 
migration to Gulf countries following the oil 
boom of 1973. Nowadays Kerala is considered 
the main source of labour to the Gulf and hence 
Kerala’s economy has become reliant on 
remittances from Gulf migration. Since job 
opportunities are scarce in Kerala due to the low 
industrial level and the rural nature of the state, 
migration seems to be the main option. 
However, migration is heavily directed towards 
the Gulf and not towards other states of India. 
High levels of income that match the high 
consumption levels of Keralites are not the only 
reason for this orientation. Muslim Malayalees 
also feel more culturally attached to the Arabs 
than to the rest of Indians. In fact, Malayalees 
regardless of their religion do not feel strong 
cultural ties to the rest of Indians (apart from 
Tamils) because of language barriers. Perhaps a 
major factor and result to this is the cheap daily 
direct flights to the Gulf, which implies that it is 
more accessible than going to Delhi (almost 
everyone who was living in the Gulf whom I 
spoke with has never been to Delhi). 
In today’s Kerala, especially Malabar or the 
Northern part, the majority of Muslims, who are 
known as the Mappila Muslims of Malabar, one 
can see the prevalence of the traditional Gulf 
female attire called ‘Abbayyah in Arabic, which 
was introduced in the Keralite setting as pardah 
and as a word does not have any resonance in 
Arabic. Although the term pardah has a 
different connotation in the Indian context 
(mainly the act of hiding the female face in 
public spaces with the shawl, regardless of 
religious affiliation), it came to denote the black 
long dress worn by the Arab Gulf women. And 
in the North Indian context, the black attire is 
called burqa, which is actually an Arabic word. 
How the word pardah traveled to the Keralite 
context remains an undiscovered linguistic 
domain.1 
The discourses concerning pardah have been 
raging for about a decade. The arguments are 
manifested on multiple levels: everyday life, the 
media and intellectual circles. The forces of 
contention are concentrated among two groups; 
those who call themselves the secularists and 
those labeled as Islamic feminists. They stand 
against the Muslim orthodox voices, sided by 
the common woman who in the majority of 
cases does not hold a specifically apparent 
sociopolitical orientation to the question of 
pardah. After 2005, with the conversion of the 
Malayalam poet Kamala Das (later Kamala 
Surayya) and her propagation of pardah as a 
means of a sense of liberation, the perception of 
pardah as an oppressive veiling instrument was 
                                                
1According to Osella&Osella (2007) the Malayalees use 
the word ‘abayya to denote the expensive imported 
pardah that carries rich symbolic capital since it is 
originally worn by the wealthy Arab Women of the Gulf. 
However, during my stay in Kerala, I did not encounter 
anyone who says ‘abayya. Eventually the differences 
came down to how much embroidery or “work” on it that 
gives it its value, and whether it is locally produced or 
imported. 
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entirely absent from the psyche of the common 
Keralite woman, who as I would be showing 
dealt with it in a manner different from the 
intellectuals. 
 The opponent camp’s argument coincides 
with the rejection of the de-traditionalisation of 
the Keralite society and the adoption of 
contemporary foreign Arabic cultural icons, 
especially consumerist and hegemonic ones. In 
a society characterized by a strong ability to 
accommodate foreign elements, this case of 
adoption of the pardah dress is associated with 
other phenomena such as the introduction of 
Egyptian, Saudi and Yemeni popular food in all 
restaurants in and around Kerala. The cultural 
flow is mixed with strong economic incentives 
that led to successful business enterprises in 
manufacturing and selling these Arab popular 
lifestyles. Male-based cults conspired with 
market mechanisms to create trends that 
dislocated the agency of women in deciding or 
‘coding’ their dressing style. During the last ten 
years, the consequent forces of social change 
and globalization have led to an interesting 
alteration in conceptions of fashion, especially 
in a society characterized by strong traditional 
rural values. 
The South Indian society witnessed massive 
social changes linked with women’s forms of 
dress. Though they were not conceived as 
agents in setting mainstream rules of decency, 
women, especially Muslims, were the most 
evident subjects of social change. Inherent and 
traditional conceptions of decency and sexuality 
in the South Indian society were reshaped 
through different phases often trespassing the 
barriers of caste and religion (Jones 1989; 
Kertzer 1988; Devika, 2007). These phases 
started with the Breast Cloth controversy of the 
early nineteenth century that culminated in 
wiping out the ban on low caste Hindu women 
to cover their bosoms, to the adoption of the 
originally Brahminical North Indian attire, 
known as the saree, then the switching to the 
salwar qameez, and lastly the pardah. 
Should we hence regard the pardah trend as a 
Gramscian phenomenon of hegemony since 
there is some implied consensual internal 
acceptance, or should we borrow Bourdieu's 
(1977) hybrid concept of symbolic violence that 
refers to the contradictory or double reality of 
conduct that is intrinsically equivocal? The case 
of the Keralite Muslim women illustrates these 
interwoven questions of agency, consumerism 
and fashion. This paper attempts at 
demonstrating these different arguments and 
showing the paradoxes of the symbolic meaning 
of agency, self-image and domination. One 
observation is the irony of how in a society 
where women outnumber men and hence 
control the outcome of the political process, 
their agency is continually denied and 
manipulated. However, the picture is more 
complex, once we employ the feminist outlook 
of situated knowledge (Haraway 1998) and take 
account of the absent narratives of the common
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woman. As I would be showing, dress in many 
cases appears as a political tool and not merely a 
reflection of a consumerist attitude (though this 
is also taken into consideration). This paper, 
hence, relates to ethnographic fieldwork 
conducted in the state of Kerala from December 
2010 until April 2011 in the two districts of 
Malappuram and Kozhikode with the 
predominant Muslim population.  
 
The Keralite-Arab linkage  
Interestingly and as it will be shown in the 
coming sections of this paper, Muslims in 
Kerala are not linked to the center of India (the 
capital) as much as they are economically and 
culturally linked to the Gulf. The practicality of 
trajectories evident in the financial linkages 
between Kerala and the Gulf led to multiple 
changes in the issue of identity. In fact, the 
history of Arab relations with Kerala goes back, 
according to certain accounts, even before the 
time of the emergence of Islam in the Arabian 
Peninsula in the seventh century. Black gold, or 
pepper, was the main reason behind relations 
based on trade. The northern districts of what is 
today known as Kerala comprise the historical 
area named Malabar. This area is characterized 
as dominantly Muslim. Malappuram is the 
district with the highest Muslim population 
amounting to 68.5 percent. Emigration to the 
Gulf states plays a major role in shaping the 
Malabari society, especially that Malappuram 
district is considered to outnumber the rest of 
the districts of Kerala in emigration (17.5 
percent of emigrants from Kerala are from 
Malappuram) but not in return emigration. In 
Kerala, 52.5 percent of Muslim households have 
one or more non-resident Keralite. In 
Malappuram alone, 71 percent of the 
households have in them either an emigrant or a 
return emigrant each. The largest amount of 
remittances in 2007 was received by 
Malappuram district, which amounted to Rs. 4.6 
thousand cores or 19 percent of the total for the 
state. Around 50 percent of the remittances to 
the state were received by the Muslim 
community, which forms less than 25 percent of 
the total population of the state.  Malayalee 
Muslim residents in the Gulf amount to 1.6 
Millions.  22.9 percent of married Muslim 
women are Gulf wives (whose husbands live 
and work in the Gulf) (Zachariah &Rajan 2007). 
The United Arab Emirates decided to open a 
consulate in Kerala to accommodate for the 
demands of its largest Indian workforce 
community and to encourage business (Padanna 
2011). 
The city of Kozhikode, formerly known as 
Calicut, has a rich history of trade with the Arab 
world. By the twelfth century it became a 
commercial center between the Arab World, 
Southeast Asia and South Asia. Historically, 
trade relations did not only result in an exchange 
of material goods of spices and wood. In fact, 
the impact of trade was witnessed in the cultural 
goods that came in a dualistic form; artistically 
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and literarily (hybrid language and folklore); 
and socially (inter-religious marriages, 
conversions and later on women's education and 
their dress code) (Karassery 1995; Dale 1980; 
Kurup 2006; Kunju 1989).  
To briefly showcase the cultural goods 
resulting from this migration, there was the 
innovation of a hybrid language known as 
Arabi-malayalam, which is basically Malayalam 
written in Arabic script, with a vocabulary 
emerging from Malayalam, Arabic, Tamil, Urdu 
and Persian. It was initially used as an 
educational and anti-colonial method of 
teaching Muslims without resorting to either 
English or the Hindu-associated sanskritized 
Malayalam.   
Malabar’s folklore is composed of hybrid art 
forms in which indigenous dancing and poetry 
were fused with Arabic themes. Duffmuttu, for 
example is an art form using the traditional 
Arabian duff (an Arabian drum). 
Contemporarily, Muslims stand in a circle 
singing an Islamic song in Malayalam while 
playing the duff. Kolkali is another performing 
art from Malabar, which is taken from the 
traditional Kalarippayatt (a form of Dravidian 
martial art using small sticks or swords). The 
change to the original ‘Hindu’ form is that 
Islamic songs accompany it, the boys are not 
bare-chested, and their heads are covered with a 
piece of cloth. One of the almost vanishing art 
forms now is the oppana, which is a form of 
singing and dancing presented by females 
during a wedding ceremony. The singing is of 
folk Mappila (Malabar’s Muslim) songs. The 
Mappila songs themselves (in Malayalam: 
Mappillapattu) also represent another hybrid 
form of art.2 
These art forms now are almost exclusively 
existent in Islamic schools’ celebrations or in 
TV programs. Whenever I attended a wedding, I 
was surprised with how void it is of any Music, 
dancing, or celebration sight apart from the 
incredible amounts of biryani and beef curry. 
Nowadays since the oil boom, this cultural 
exchange is not only one-sided but also 
consumerist to a great extent. As I noticed 
during my stay, goods, dressing and eating 
styles came in to replace and suppress the 
artistic forms of exchange.  
 
Consumerist trends as a result of migration 
and the enlargement of the middle-class 
Migration led to many results, among which is 
the enlargement of the Middle class in Kerala. 
Most people I interviewed, especially the 
elderly, stressed how Kerala fifty years ago was 
a very different place. Hunger, poverty and 
modesty were major features of everyday life. 
These were transformed by ‘Gulf money’. 
According to a survey conducted by the 
National Council for Applied Economic
                                                
2A version of Arabi-Malayalam is found in the Muslim 
Mappila Songs sang in Malabar. These songs are divided 
in various categories. Of these categories are the 
weddings songs (kalyanapaatu), praising prophets and 
saints (madhpattu), and war songs. See: Karassery, M.N. 
1995.  
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Research, Kerala's Muslim households average 
earnings was 29,991 INR/year in comparison 
with Hindus households’ average of 26,344/year 
(Iype 2004). 
The increased rate of food consumption, 
especially among the Muslims is a major trend. 
Muslims do a thriving business in restaurants all 
around the state serving usually the same menu. 
The appearance of Arab diners is a notable 
feature. Several restaurants in Kozhikode carry 
names such as: Arabian Diner, Arabian food, 
and Albake (a famous fast food chain for fried 
chicken in Saudi Arabia). Their almost identical 
menus are comprised of Saudi and Yemeni meat 
dishes.  
Another Gulf-influenced trend is the shops 
selling what Malayalees call “Gulf Products”. 
These products are not all manufactured in the 
Gulf, but are usually imported. Examples of 
these goods are mobile phones, computers, 
kitchen and cooking devices, blankets, a specific 
washing liquid called Fairy and the Tang drink 
(an orange powder drink always served to 
guests).  
The prevalence of a strong consumer culture 
is linked to an established purchasing power of 
women. This is not only attributed to consumer 
goods, but also to the common goal of directing 
remittances towards building or renovating 
houses; a goal that ended up as a trend. Perhaps 
what is most significant about this trend is that 
women's agency and autonomy appear here 
particularly strongly. Usually it is the women 
who are the recipients of money that their 
husbands send through bank transfers or 
Western Union, and hence are often solely 
responsible for all the paperwork concerning 
obtaining construction permits from the 
municipality, choosing a design for the house 
and managing all construction-related steps. In a 
survey conducted by Zachariah & Rajan in 
2007, the role of the wife in managing the 
finances of the household was very apparent; 60 
percent of respondents manage on their own and 
69 percent have their own bank accounts. 
Whereas this strong agency in using the money 
is observable, there is no labor mobility for 
Muslim women in Kerala. It is even 
inconceivable for a woman to decide to travel 
for work purposes. However, the emphasis on 
education is slowly changing this mind-set since 
traveling for educational purposes has been 
sanctioned socially, although still limited to 
Kerala.  
 
Appearance of Pardah and different dressing 
styles  
Analysing the trend of wearing a standardized 
dress as the black pardah collides with the 
reality of how religion and fashion cults operate 
in a rural society that is increasingly globalized 
and witnessing massive cultural cross-border 
interactions. These dynamics are manifested 
through the empirical examples demonstrated in 
this paper. According to a survey conducted in 
Calicut, there was a notable increase in pardah 
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usage3from 3.5 percent in 1990 to 32.5 percent 
by 2000 in the northern regions of Kerala 
(Basheer 2002). Osella and Osella (2007) 
observed an even higher percentage while 
conducting their research in 2002-2004: around 
50 percent, with 90 percent usage in the old 
Muslim area of the city, Thekkepuram. This is 
also obvious from the increase in the sales of the 
major pardah manufacturing company 
(Hoorulyn) in Kerala since its inception in 1992 
from 100 dresses to 10,000 by 2002 (De Jong, 
quoted in Osella and Osella 2007). 
During my fieldwork, I observed the 
hegemony of the North Indian Salwar-Qameez 
(referred to as churidaar in Kerala) in Calicut 
University and its affiliated non-religious 
colleges, as well as in the city itself. This is 
contrast to the dominance of pardah in Islamic 
colleges and in its outdoor usage in the villages 
of Northern Kerala.4 As opposed to the reason 
of practicality that led to the dispersion of 
pardah among housewives (being a quick dress 
as opposed to the saree), the stipulation of 
pardah as a compulsory uniform in educational 
institutions carries symbolic significance, which 
will be further investigated. 
                                                
3 Defining ‘usage’ is a problematic issue since there is a 
noted flexibility in the decision to wear a pardah. Basheer 
(2002) himself in his article does not specify what he 
means by using the pardah and whether it is an exclusive 
choice of dress or as it is in Kerala, one of the options 
women adopt besides the saree and the salwar-qameez. 
4 For those women working in field, the commonly used 
dress is the “maxi” or the house long cotton dress or the 
traditional Keralite dress formed of a blouse and a skirt 
(here the religious differences will dictate the form of the 
blouse).  
Although some studies have pointed out the 
difference in the appearance of women in the 
public space,5 the Keralite case offers an 
exception to the common narratives on India 
that focus on the Northern states. In fact, 
Muslim and non-Muslim Keralites appear to be 
concerned an obsession with decency in public 
spaces (or to be more precise with the male-
dominated conception of decency).6 Not only 
are Muslim women constrained in their dresses, 
but Hindus as well. You would rarely see a 
Hindu woman wearing jeans or a T-shirt 
especially in Calicut. This leaves Christians as 
the most liberal in their choice of ‘Western’ 
clothing, especially in the districts of Ernakulam 
and Thrissur, where they are concentrated.  
Interviews showed the expected conformity 
to concepts of modesty and decency. “The saree 
shows every single part of the woman’s body, 
but with the pardah it is impossible, but of 
course you can still see the shape, but not like 
the saree,” a female student informed me. The 
definition of modesty, however, varies from the 
Muslim perspective to the non-Muslim one. For 
the non-Muslim and especially the Hindu,
                                                
5 Examples are J. Abu Lughod (1987), who touches upon 
this difference, yet in a reductionist manner focusing only 
on North India, in her article the Islamic city, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, pp. 160-
161. Otherwise, C. Gupta (2002), Sexuality, Obscenity, 
Community: Women, Muslims and the Hindu Public in 
Colonial India. New York: Palgrave, discusses general 
gender identity formations in colonial India.   
6 This was obvious to me during their everyday 
conversations and their remarks on my dress (both in 
India and in Egypt), in addition to what is being dispersed 
through the written media.  
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modesty revolves around wrapping, restraining, 
and binding: clothes are tight, wound around the 
body, and jewelry such as anklets and bangles 
contain the bodily extremities. There is an 
emphasis on binding, sealing, and restraining 
(Osella&Osella 2007: 4). 
The obsession with wrapping as a form of 
protection of the female comes in contrast to the 
Muslim idea of covering and hiding. Islamic 
texts clearly stress avoiding any tight and thus 
revealing forms of clothing. Hence, for Muslim 
women, the saree would still be appropriate if 
the blouse underneath is full-sleeved and 
covering her midriff or stomach and back. Not 
to mention wrapping a scarf on her head or 
using the end of the saree to cover her head. 
Consequently, Muslim women could be easily 
identified from non-Muslim ones by looking at 
the way they wrap their sarees. Muslims never 
show their stomach, and thus the saree end is 
always loose enabling them to wrap it over their 
heads in case they are not wearing a headscarf, 
whereas the Hindu style is what Muslims call 
‘steps’, because the end of the saree is multiply 
folded and pinned allowing the midriff or at 
least part of it to be shown. Still, some elements 
in the mentality of decency remained common 
between communities, and this is of tight 
sleeves. While non-Muslims prefer tight short 
sleeves, Muslims differ only in the fact that their 
sleeves are long. But they still stitch them 
tightly. I had a personal encounter on this matter 
when I tried to convince a lady tailor to make 
my blouse that she had just stitched a bit looser, 
and she kept looking at me puzzled and not 
understanding why I would wear it loose. 
This proves that there is a constant puzzle 
when it comes to being practical and being 
fashion-conscious. In an extremely hot place 
like Kerala, one would guess that women would 
automatically opt for cotton headscarves. 
However, wherever I searched for one, I could 
never find any cotton mafta (Malayalam for 
head scarf). These maftas were always made of 
the same polyester material and found in exactly 
three colors: black, beige, and white. They were 
always in the same shape. This gave a clue on 
how standardized the society is, not to mention 
the strong tendency to conformity. I wondered 
how that the range of what could be called 
fashionable scarves was very limited. When 
comparing with Egypt or Turkey, where there is 
a widespread custom of covering the hair, there 
is always a huge array of scarves. Interestingly, 
you can find very colorful headscarves that are 
made in India and sold in Egypt. However, 
throughout my trips all over India, I never found 
these maftas (which have a specific size 
rendering them easy for wrapping on the head).  
The fascination with fashion is linked to a 
trend in boutique business in Kerala among the 
upper class Muslim women. Opening a boutique 
is a popular option for women without a 
professional degree, allowing them to work. 
 During my stay in Kerala, I encountered a 
recently divorced woman who decided to open a 
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boutique. She traveled with some members of 
her family to Mumbai to get fabrics for salwar-
qameez suits and sarees and sold them at higher 
prices to gain profit. They were elegant yet 
simple fabrics, which symbolized upper class 
taste.  
There is a noticeable attentiveness in asking 
for the price of what one wears. In addition to 
this, whereas there is rarely a discussion over 
the fabric, there is great interest in buying 
clothes with heavy embroidery or appliqués 
(what they call ‘work’) and a trendy color and 
design. This means that if someone wears 
polyester clothes in extremely hot weather, their 
mentality is highly fashion-blinded and 
practicality does not play a significant role in 
their choice of clothes, especially that there was 
a witnessed disregard for cotton suits which 
were looked upon as a form of cheap house 
dress. This is not limited to women, but extends 
to men also. Since skinny tight jeans were 
trendy (according to what they see in Gulf 
markets and TV) then it became a cult among 
young men. However, those who are still 
studying at madrasas7would refrain from going 
to the madrasa with these trousers because they 
know such attire is not accepted by the religious 
people. Young men also have an allure towards 
what they call a jubba, which is simply the 
                                                
7 Madrasas are Islamic schools in which children are 
taught the basic principles of Islam and the Quranic 
teachings. In Kerala, most Muslim children go to a 
Madrasa either from sunrise till eight in the morning and 
then head to the modern school, or they go in the evening 
once they finish school.  
North Indian Kurta (long Indian shirt). This 
could be translated as an attempt to copy the 
North Indian political elite image and to break 
the stereotypical image of a South Indian man. 
These empirical examples are meant to show the 
clash resulting from the interaction between 
urban values and rural societies. Kerala is a 
fascinating example to show how globalization 
managed to penetrate the rural society and inject 
in it urban trends and fascinations. A culture of 
appropriated consumption was inherently 
related to a negotiative space of women’s 
agency and empowerment, which was reflected 
in small-scale boutique and beauty parlour 
businesses.  
 Coming to the usage of pardah, the case of 
Kerala presents us with a different scenario than 
the already studied one of Egypt, Northern 
India, and Western European societies. In some 
societies, the shift to wearing a pardah is an 
ideological decision based on a conviction that 
it is exclusively Muslim and decent dress. A 
woman in Egypt who chooses to wear a pardah 
(or ‘Abayya to be contextually correct) would 
not easily return to wearing standard clothes 
(skirt and blouse, or blouse and trousers). And 
most definitely, would not be switching her 
dressing styles in the public sphere. In Kerala, it 
is a matter of context and convenience. Most 
women in villages would wear one on her house 
dress (the maxi: a long loose half or full-sleeved 
simple dress). The same woman when going to 
a wedding would wear a saree, and perhaps 
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when going shopping for clothes or when 
visiting some relatives would wear a salwar-
qameez suit. Apart from female students of 
Islamic or Arabic Studies, the use of pardah in 
public is never compulsory, not even from the 
family. The northern Indian context gives us 
another contradictory image, since the decision 
to wear a pardah comes out of compulsion and 
not a free choice. In this case, it is associated 
with covering the face in most of the time. In 
Kerala, however, it is a rare case to see a woman 
with her face covered, and if this happens, then 
they would be often labeled by other pardah-
clad women as extremists or belonging to a 
tablighi jama’at family.8Interestingly, the 
spaces for a public discourse on pardah 
functions in a Lefebvrian manner, as they 
appear not only to serve as a tool of action, but 
also as a means of production, social control and 
domination (Lefebvre 1991) as I will show in 
the next section. 
These discourses concerning the usage of 
pardah are entangled within a matrix of 
multiple identities in Kerala; the Pan-Islamic 
identity meets the South Indian Malayalee’s 
customs and directs her through a gulf-centered 
lens. Osella & Osella (2007) appropriately 
capture the reasons Muslims attribute their use 
                                                
8The Tabligih Jama’at is one of the several Muslim 
organizations in India that has an international network 
and is basically focusing on preaching and proselytizing 
principles of Islam. For more information on this 
organization, see: Sikand, Y. (2002). The Origins and 
Development of the Tablighi Jama’at (1920-2000): A 
cross-country comparative study. New Delhi: Orient 
Longman.   
of pardah in addition to the above-mentioned 
reason of convenience. The first emerges from 
the role of social and religious reformist 
organizations such as the Kerala Nadwatul 
Mujahideen. The second is the growing sense of 
marginalization and insecurity of the Muslims 
as a minority community due to rising Hindu 
chauvinistic nationalism. This is particularly 
obvious in northern parts of the country, but not 
in Kerala. The feeling of being a threatened 
minority does not find fertile soil in Kerala, 
especially in the heavily populated Muslim 
areas. This is why I will focus more on the role 
of reformist organizations in the “religious 
marketing” of the pardah.  
 
Reformists and their obsession with the body 
Since the early nineteenth century, reformist 
movements started appearing in Kerala in 
different communities. For the Muslim 
community, reformist organizations emerged in 
the early twentieth century after the Malabar 
Rebellion when religious leaders (ulema) started 
facing the deteriorated conditions of Muslims 
particularly in the educational field. Apart from 
Nadwatul Mujahideen, or the Islahi (Reformist) 
Movement in Kerala, Jamaati Islami- i-hind's 
Kerala chapter is gaining increasing ground in 
the social spectrum. In addition to educational 
and economic uplifting of the community, these 
reformists assumed a role of the responsibility 
in policing women's moral conduct. They 
considered themselves responsible in front of 
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God, not just to educate women and be 
financially responsible for them, but also to 
ensure their decency and their compliance with 
their own version of divine rules of decency. In 
an article published in the Jamaati Islami 
Women's wing magazine (Aaraaman), the editor 
had referred to pardah as “a modern dress for 
moral women” (Basheer 2002). 
 Interestingly, not only Muslim women were 
subject of this mentality, but all Malayalee 
women in general (the upper caste Namboodiri 
Brahmins or the lower caste Ezhavas). Devika 
and Husain (2010) share my opinion by calling 
this process ‘re-forming women.’ They point to 
two constant and contemporary pressures on 
Muslim women in Kerala: the pressure on the 
young woman to “conform to norms of dressing 
found desirable by certain elements claiming to 
represent community interest”, and the pressure 
of the threat to life in some cases.9  
 A great paradox of the reformist agenda 
appears. Not only do the reformist ulema allow 
women to go to mosques, but they also 
encourage them to do so, unlike the prevalent 
and dominant attitude of the Sufi (called Sunni 
in Kerala) trend to ban women from entering 
mosques. Mujahids and Jamaati Islami 
reformers stress on education for girls and 
                                                
9 By showing the In the case of Rayana (a Muslim college 
student in her twenties who received death threats in 2010 
to shift to wearing the pardah), Devika and Hussain 
(2010) explain how it was obvious that there was 
inadequate support from media, religious and feminist 
organizations, as well as the police to seriously condemn 
the pressure to conformity. 
women (both secular and religious). Their 
social, cultural and educational activities are 
always intermingled (both sexes are in same 
classrooms and same conference venues) 
without any physical barrier separating them. 
Girls are given spaces to voice their opinions 
through GIO (the Jamaati Islami Girls Islamic 
Organization) and MGM (The Mujahid Girls 
Movement). However, all this is performed 
while a strict dress code is being inscribed.  
Choosing what to teach, choosing which 
experience to write about, and choosing whom 
to talk about are all in the hands of men 
(especially through media). It was interesting 
for me to see that the role of women in anti-
colonial struggles of the Arab world was totally 
invisible in any of the publications, curricula, 
and topics of research (many girls had the same 
topic of studying Bint Alshati',10 but none 
dealing with political feminist figures). There 
was a perplexing and noticeable gap between 
women's roles in the Middle East in deploying 
charity organizations as spaces for assertion of 
their public role, and the nonexistence of this in 
a developed state like Kerala. GIO and MGM's 
activities remain limited to a great extent and 
ends with the marriage of students.  
                                                
10 Bint alshati’ (the Arabic for the Daughter of the 
Riverbank) was the pen name used by one of the most 
famous Arabic literary figures. Her real name was Ayesha 
Abd El-Rahman and she was an Egyptian writer who 
lived from 1913 until 1998. She specialized in writing the 
biographies of early Muslim women.  
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Of the established social realities in Kerala are 
the hurdles put in the path of a married Muslim 
woman inhibiting her from venturing into public 
action affairs (with few individual exceptions). 
Despite the high index of human 
development that Kerala witnesses and the 
advanced progress the Muslim-dominated 
district records, another gender paradox 
remains. Educated and employed women are 
strong victims of violence (whether physical 
through sexual harassment or getting threat 
letters, or symbolic through rumors). They 
easily become victims of individuation, stress 
and depression (mental illnesses). Individuation 
is a serious problem that resulted from 
education (Devika & Mukherjee 2007). No 
matter how the society tried to solve this 
problem through molding girls' minds into the 
utter belief of their indispensible domestic 
function; they end up suffering from depression. 
The role of reformist organizations enters in the 
dynamics by offering a public space through 
which these individuated spaces of seclusion 
could be overcome. However, this space is 
controlled by the adherence to the pardah as a 
code of entry.  
 
Discourses on Pardah (Secularists versus 
Islamists) versus what women themselves say 
The increasing appearance of pardah in Kerala's 
public spaces triggered an incredible volume of 
debate within the Malayalee society. These 
debates emerge on a spectrum encompassing the 
liberal secularists on the one hand, and the 
Islamist Secularists11on the other. Women as 
subaltern individuals or agents remain somehow 
outside this spectrum. The dilemma that this 
classification poses is being trapped in 
reductionist analysis of the reality of pardah in 
Kerala. The liberal secularist intellectuals 
perceive it as an enforced adoption of an alien 
Arab oppressive tool and thus a threat to the 
communally harmonious nature of Kerala, while 
the Islamists perceive it as an indicative 
expression of freedom of belief and practice 
guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. Both 
interpretations ignore the perspective of women 
either as agents or as subjects to the 
phenomenon.  
Some intellectuals who do not align 
themselves in any exclusive category signaled 
their concern over the increasing critique of 
pardah since it might be strongly related to 
Hindu nationalistic forces. They often exclaim 
as to why only Muslim women appear as 
subjects of contention in media. In a family 
magazine published by the Mujahid 
organization, the following comment was noted 
in one of the letters of readers as a response to 
an article on pardah. In his letter, titled “Should 
                                                
11 Since the Islamists emphasize secularism as a domain 
giving them freedom to work and thus opting for it as an 
ideal system, it would be unfair and contextually incorrect 
to override their opinion by juxtaposing them against the 
Liberals. Mainstream theorization on this matter portray 
Islamists as inherently anti-secular forces, whereas 
liberals as carrying the secularist torch. For matters of 
precision, I decided to refer to both as secularists. 
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we fear pardah?” he ridiculed modern dresses 
showing the body and the women who wear 
them. According to him, people have no 
problem if Sister Maria (any Christian lady) or 
Devi Kumari (any Hindu Lady) wears pardah or 
any dress. People have a problem only when 
one Khadija wears it (Putare 2011).  
Haraway (1998) and the feminist standpoint 
of situated knowledge affirm the need to avoid a 
doctrine of transcendence-based objectivity or a 
theory of "innocent powers" and instead to seek 
"an earth wide network of connections, 
including the ability partially to translate 
knowledge among very different- and power-
differentiated communities" (580). To Haraway, 
the position of the subjugated is preferred 
because they promise more "adequate, 
sustained, objective, transforming accounts of 
the world" (584). Hence, power and resistance 
need not operate exclusively in dualistic forms. 
Domination is always attributed to a distinction 
between persuading and coercing, as Mitchell 
(1990) argues, and this dualistic conception fails 
to capture several analytic aspects. I see it most 
fitting to apply this logic to the debates on 
pardah. The emergence of the trend of pardah 
is not about women being forced to adopt it, but 
it is more complicated. Pardah spreading is 
about a trend that acquired a wide base of 
legitimacy. On the one hand there is the 
authority of the ulema, which acts as the power 
that persuades the Muslim mind (both male and 
female) of the requirement of the pardah. On 
the other hand, there is the wealth and luxurious 
lifestyles of the Gulf Arabs convincing the 
female of being modern, fashionable and 
prosperous.  
 
 
Figure: Malayalam newspaper advertising of pardah 
shop depicting the Muslim woman as a modern one. 
Source: From Author’s collection. 
 
 When interviewing students, it was obvious 
that their recourse to pardah comes out of it 
being the school or college uniform, but they 
will hardly wear it in any non-school related 
activity. As for school teachers, interestingly, 
they also had to abide by a certain dress code, in 
some schools it was exclusively the pardah, and 
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in other schools, some teachers told me that the 
churidaar was banned and that only sarees with 
an overcoat or pardah were permitted as the 
uniform.   
One day I went to a municipality in Kerala 
with a predominantly Muslim population, and I 
interviewed a middle-class Muslim lawyer. I 
had lunch with his family in his house, which 
was another big mansion (his father lived all his 
life in Saudi Arabia). His wife, who was also a 
lawyer, was wearing a half sleeved suit and not 
covering her hair. I enquired if this was her 
normal dressing style. She told me that she had 
come originally from Trivandrum, and that there 
was no culture of pardah or covering the hair 
over there. But when she went to work where 
she was living, then she was compelled to wear 
a saree and use its end to cover her head. With a 
sarcastic smile on her face, she told me: 
“Otherwise, I just wear half sleeves like now 
and look like a Hindu. But I do not mind it.” 
One of the novelties about the Keralite case, 
in my opinion, is that the decision to conform 
should be seen as a rational decision in many 
cases. Weighing the consequences of 
nonconformity to the pardah as a moral dress 
would only mean more contentions, whereas the 
conformity leads women, especially those 
belonging to orthodox families, to spaces 
otherwise denied to them. Education and work, 
classically seen as women-free zones, became 
zones in which a woman can appear and 
intermingle with the other sex freely as long as 
she is conforming to the uniform of the pardah. 
In addition to this, pardah signifies upward 
mobility, and especially in a caste-based society, 
affluence is linked to the desire to be 
fashionable. Thus, the decision to wear a pardah 
is not just about conformity, but also about 
being fashion-blinded and desiring to be looked 
to as a higher class person. Here it should be 
noted that although caste and class are 
profoundly linked, they are not identical social 
categories. 
There is also an interesting fascination with 
the black color; some would attribute it to being 
modest, and thus avoiding flamboyant colors. 
However, my ethnographic work revealed that 
this fascination is not restricted to the Gulf-
imported pardah color, but also when it came to 
henna that women apply to their hands. Black 
not only makes you look fashionable (because it 
is related to the Gulf), but also white, meaning 
not so dark-skinned (because of the perception 
that white skin is more beautiful and thus there 
is some contrast once black is worn or applied 
to one's hands).  
 Gifts, from a woman to another, are usually 
a pardah, especially from those arriving from 
the gulf. I was also told that when someone 
brings some fabric to a tailor to be stitched into 
a simple pardah, the tailor would charge more, 
although logically it is easier than stitching a 
salwar-qameez suit. 
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Concluding remarks 
There are certain factors affecting and shaping 
Keralite society and thus the formation of the 
Pardah cult. The first is growing consumerism 
as a result of Gulf migration and the aspirational 
values linked to a desire to mimic the affluent 
Gulf lifestyles. The second is the disruption of 
older social and individual values that happened 
due to Islamic reformist movements, migration 
and elevated standard of living. Third, the 
influence of media in promoting pardah through 
editorial pieces or through advertisements is 
easily discernible. Finally, the increasing crime 
rate and violence against women (Malappuram 
district being the highest) led women to easily 
adopt a dress that is perceived by everyone as a 
safety-inducer. 
Kerala is considered to be the land of 
contradictions. On the one hand, it has the 
highest levels of literacy, human development, 
life expectancy, and income in India. And on the 
other hand, it suffers from the highest levels of 
alcoholism, suicide, crimes, and dowry in 
comparison with other states of India. The state 
of contradictions extends to the topic of this 
paper. In the Muslim dominated state district 
where female voters outnumber the males, and 
thus they determine political destinies, their 
lives are heavily designed by the males. 
What is witnessed in Kerala is the constant 
regulation of the public space of freedom of 
choice within a secular democratic state. An 
interview respondent spoke to me about how 
she perceives the relationship between the dress-
code and freedom on the one hand, and building 
a model on the other hand. To her, an important 
question was in whose hands does legitimacy 
lie? 
‘Why should we not follow the Arabs, but 
why should we follow the upper caste 
Hindus? The saree was never a south 
Indian dress. It is a northern Brahminical 
dress. We all know that the women in the 
south were allowed to wear only a piece 
of cloth from her waist onwards to the 
knee. So is this what we are supposed to 
go back to wearing?’ 
For her, the saree appeared as an imposed 
national dress with an upper class Hindu 
identity (the cream and gold embroidered 
handloom saree).12 Resisting this enforced 
image of the Keralite woman was an important 
task in her non-religious fight against casteism. 
And while a girl like her was fighting the caste 
battle, others were fighting another identity 
battle, of the cultural infringement of the Saudi 
version of Islam on Kerala’s harmonious 
society. But this is one side of the story, a story 
often narrated by the intellectuals.  
What this paper seeks to demonstrate is the 
everyday account of the common Malayalee 
woman and her position in relation to these 
                                                
12 The national image included other ornamental additions 
that were considered non-Muslim in the Keralite context 
(there was the bindi (which only non-Muslims apply), and 
the jasmine garland on the hair (which Muslims put only 
in their own weddings and is usually covered with the end 
of their saree). 
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discourses. I have sought to show how, unlike 
the heavily studied cases of burqa or hijab or 
niqab in the Middle East and Europe, the 
Keralite case is one of complexity and 
flexibility. The paradoxical situation resulting 
from the entanglement of the private sphere 
with the public sphere is a major factor 
contributing to this complexity. To some, 
pardah gives an opportunity to be fast and 
spontaneous and in many cases a housewife 
finds in the pardah a tool to escape the 
traditional confines of class and fashion. For 
others, pardah is their access key to education 
and employment and while some are obliged to 
wear it as a uniform, they still have the option to 
shift to any dress of their choice.  
“Hurry up, put on your pardah and let us go 
to have ice-cream,” this was a statement I often 
heard from the Malayalee lady I was living 
with. 
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